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Rethinking corruption: hocus-pocus, locus and focus 
Paul M Heywood 
 
Abstract 
Although there has been a significant increase in research on the phenomenon of corruption over the last 
quarter-century, there is little evidence that this has resulted in effective policy interventions, nor in any 
significant reduction in its scope and extent.  This article argues that three main reasons account for this 
failure to develop effective anti-corruption measures.  First, the dominance of economistic analyses of the 
role of incentives in decision-making has given rise to proposed institutional fixes that are too abstracted 
from reality to gain purchase.  That dominance was partly prompted by a misplaced assumption that 
market-based liberal democracies would become the modal regime type following the collapse of 
communism.  Second, an emphasis on the nation state as the primary unit of analysis has not kept pace 
with significant changes in how some forms of corruption operate in practice, nor with the changing nature 
of states themselves.  Third, different types of corruption are insufficiently disaggregated according not just 
to kind and form, but also to the locations in which they occur (sectoral, organisational, geographical), the 
actors involved, and the dependencies that enable them.  This reflects an overuse of the term ‘corruption’ 
in both academic literature and policy recommendations; insufficient attention is paid to what exactly is 
being addressed and ultimately, the notion of corruption, without adjectives, is a poor guide both to analysis 
and to policy prescription. 
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Introduction 
Academic research on corruption and how to combat it has vastly increased over the last twenty-five years.  
However, the jury remains out on whether such an increase in productivity has had any meaningful effect 
in terms of actually reducing corruption.  Indeed, some evidence suggests that global concerns about 
corruption are on the increase1, even if we have no reliable way of measuring precisely the extent of the 
problem2.  The apparent mismatch between the attention focused on corruption and our collective capacity 
to make a practical difference naturally raises questions about what might be going wrong.  This article 
identifies three reasons for such a discrepancy: the way in which corruption has been conceptualised in 
much mainstream academic research, resulting in ‘magic bullet’ solutions based on institutional 
reconfiguration (hocus-pocus); the tendency of much research and anti-corruption advocacy to concentrate 
on nation-states as the primary unit of analysis (locus); and the lack of sufficient disaggregation of different 
types and modalities of corruption beyond crude binary divisions that do not recognise the complexities of 
an increasingly transnational world (focus).  Another way of presenting the argument is that approaches to 
studying and fighting corruption have been characterised by social theories developed in the mid-twentieth 
century being used to underpin practical remedies developed in the late twentieth century, but applied to a 
twenty-first century context that no longer matches the initial propositions.   
Many of the examples used to illustrate and support the argument in this article are drawn from 
the experience of the post-Communist world, reflecting the signal importance of the end of the Cold War 
and the consequent reordering of the financial world order in stimulating the massive increase in the 
attention paid to corruption.3  As noted by Abed and Gupta,  
The breakup of the former Soviet Union (…) brought on one of the most profound and far-
reaching transformations of the twentieth century. The disintegration of the command structures 
in the old regimes triggered some of the most chaotic economic, political, and social changes in 
modern history. Absence of the rule of law and accountable systems of governance led to rent 
seeking, corruption, and outright thievery.4 
The quasi-triumphalist belief that capitalism had ‘won’ contributed to the aggressive implementation of the 
so-called Washington consensus, characterised by what became the global hegemony of neoliberal, market-
focused policy prescriptions best summarised by the twin axes of privatisation and deregulation.5  This 
post-Keynesian turn had a huge influence on how corruption was understood and the remedies proposed 
to address it. 
 
Hocus-pocus: thinking differently about how to understand (anti-)corruption 
There has been no shortage of attempts to define corruption6.  In this article, I do not want to engage 
directly with that debate.  The widely-accepted generic definition that corruption is ‘the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain’, as popularised by Transparency International, is less than ideal, but none the less 
serves to capture the essence of what we instinctively understand by the term – even if it still leaves open 
the question of what exactly constitutes abuse and who decides.  My emphasis here is more on arguments 
about why corruption occurs and what needs to be done to prevent it, rather than trying to establish a 
definitive account of what it precisely entails.   
Over recent decades, the dominant approach to understanding corruption has adopted a principal-
agent (P-A) lens influenced by neo-institutional economics; that is, corruption occurs when the interests of 
the principal and the agent diverge, there is informational asymmetry between them that favours the agent, 
and the principal can determine the pay-off rules of the relationship they enter into7.  This broad approach, 
with various modifications and adaptations, has underpinned much of the work that looks at the impact of 
corruption on economic growth – the key driver behind the increased concern about corruption since the 
end of the Cold War8.  P-A analysis thus influenced the reform proposals that characterised mainstream 
thinking about anti-corruption, reflected most notably in Klitgaard’s (in)famous ‘corruption formula’: 
‘corruption equals monopoly power plus discretion minus accountability’ (C=M+D-A)9.  The P-A 
approach to understanding corruption is also evident in the highly influential work of other scholars, 
notably Rose-Ackerman10 and Bardhan11, that helped inform and shape mainstream anti-corruption policies 
proposed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other international organisations. 
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What followed from this understanding of corruption being primarily a P-A problem was the belief 
that it could be reduced by establishing institutions that would promote ‘good governance’, understood in 
strongly normative terms.  These reformed institutions would change the incentive structures facing key 
actors, and would be supported by more effective monitoring and control mechanisms: that is, they would 
reduce monopoly and discretion, and increase accountability.  In essence, the good governance approach 
rests on the belief that it is possible to identify ‘principled principals’, who will be somehow impervious to 
the kind of rational utility-maximising calculations that drive the rent-seeking actions of agents.  Such a 
notion seems to run counter to the behavioural assumptions about motivation on which the argument rests.  
Moreover, this approach cannot explain why in a given institutional setting, different individuals behave 
differently.  It also assumes that there is some way of designing and implementing new institutions that is 
not itself subject to subversion by corruption. 
An alternative perspective, associated primarily with Mungiu-Pippidi12 and with Persson, Rothstein 
and Teorell13, seeks to understand corruption more as a collective action issue, critically dependent on 
citizens’ assessments of how others will behave in any given situation.  Such an approach reflects the model 
developed by Ostrom14 in relation to common pool resources.  Thus, according to Persson et al., in 
situations where corruption is so widespread as to be near systemic, individuals may well conclude that it 
makes little sense for them not to act corruptly when everyone else is doing so: ‘Insofar as corrupt behaviour 
is the expected behaviour, everyone should be expected to act corruptly, including both the group of actors 
to whom the principal–agent framework refers to as “agents” and the group of actors referred to as 
“principals.”’15  A similar idea was neatly encapsulated some years earlier by Grodeland, Koshechkina and 
Miller in the title of their article on corruption in post-Communist Europe: ‘foolish to give and yet more 
foolish not to take’16.   
More recently, Marquette and Peiffer17 have provided a comprehensive assessment of the 
principal-agent and collective action approaches to corruption, arguing that the issue should not be 
understood in either-or terms.  Instead, each perspective has something valuable to offer, depending on 
context.  Moreover, they add a further perspective to the P-A/CA debate, pointing out that whilst both 
approaches see corruption in wholly negative terms, for citizens who live in systemically corrupt settings it 
may in fact be a positive solution.  This ‘problem-solving’ understanding of corruption – in which lived 
experience means that it may be the only means of accessing basic needs – stresses how corruption can 
therefore serve as a positive function for citizens (and political leaders) who need to operate and survive in 
the context of weak or ineffective state institutions.   
Some of these attempts to overcome the dualism of P-A/CA approaches in understanding citizen 
responses to corruption have a striking parallel in the earlier work of Kuran on ‘preference falsification’, 
that is ‘the act of misrepresenting one’s wants under perceived social pressure’18. Early versions of the 
theory of preference falsification sought to explain the practical functioning of how many East European 
citizens experienced ‘living a lie’ under communism, professing support in public for the regime they lived 
under, but privately despising it.19  From a social theory perspective, Kuran wanted to explain why it was 
not possible for scholars to predict the point at which the communist edifice would collapse in spite of the 
long-lived widespread opposition to it from within20.  His approach sought to overcome the division 
between structural and rational choice approaches to explaining revolution by highlighting that preference 
falsification was both a source of stability for communist regimes and also a reason for their rapid 
disintegration.  In communist regimes, that routinely demanded support from citizens, individuals faced a 
personal trade-off between internal and external costs: that is, the psychological cost of preference 
falsification in expressing support versus the assumed cost of siding with opposition to the regime.  As 
opposition was seen to grow, so the internal trade-off shifted for ever more individuals, resulting in the 
emergence of a ‘revolutionary bandwagon’.  However, for any given individual, it is impossible to know at 
what tipping point preference falsification gives way to action, meaning that the timing and speed of the 
overall snowball effect is inherently unpredictable.  Kuran expresses this in terms of the relationship 
between an individual (i), the level of opposition (S), private preferences (xi), and the revolutionary 
threshold (Ti): a person’s internal payoff varies positively with their private preferences, which in turn are 
influenced by what they see around them, and so as xi rises as a function of a growth in S, so Ti falls. 
As Kuran argues, preference falsification is routine in all types of regime, not just non-
democracies21.  The argument has a clear resonance with the reluctance of individuals in a host of settings 
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to take a stand against corruption even when they are strongly opposed to it: a fear of potential 
consequences can easily lead someone ostensibly to support activity they know is wrong.  However, unlike 
collective action approaches that essentially account for non-action, preference falsification also helps 
explain why in some circumstances, people do take a dramatic stand against corruption, as happened in the 
‘Arab Spring’.  Just as in the case of the collapse of communism, it was impossible to predict the timing of 
the popular risings that characterised the Arab Spring, when rejection of corruption became a leitmotiv of 
protestors across the region.  In regard to Kuran’s formula, in this case it could be argued that the individual 
payoff for many citizens reached the point at which private preferences outweighed preference falsification, 
particularly once they saw others taking a stand: their individual revolutionary threshold was crossed and 
they joined the protestors.  
Whilst not on the scale of the Arab Spring, popular protests against corruption22 have become 
widespread globally, with major demonstrations taking place – for instance – in India (2011), Argentina 
(2012), Lithuania (2012), Brazil (2013), Bulgaria (2013), Ghana (2014), Kuwait (2014), Mexico (2014), 
Thailand (2014), Ukraine (2014), Guatemala (2015), Honduras (2015), Iraq (2015) and Lebanon (2015).23  
Although there may seem little ostensible relationship between academic debates about theories of 
corruption on the one hand, and raw street protests on the other, they do share a significant common 
feature: in virtually all these cases, ‘corruption’ is presented as an undifferentiated target, operating as a sort 
of catch-all term to encompass negative behaviours. 
In practice, of course, there are all kinds of implicit differentiations at work in both the academic 
literature and amongst the protestors.  The latter are often broad-ranging in their demands for change, but 
insofar as they have a focus on corruption it is usually governmental, with political leaders at all levels (local, 
provincial, national) seen as crooks, thieves and general ne’er-do-wells24.  In part, this reflects how the 
discourse around corruption has developed in recent decades.  As Krastev has argued, following the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, corruption came to serve as a universal explanation for all 
failings: ‘Corruption is the most powerful policy narrative in the time of transition. (…) Blaming corruption 
for the post-communist citizen is the only way to express his disappointment with the present political 
elites (…). Talking about corruption is the way post-communist public talks about politics, economy, about 
past and future’.25  In similar vein, Bratsis observed, ‘Regardless of the interpretive frame (…), the specter 
of corruption is a constant (…), corruption seems to refer to underlying tensions, antagonisms, and traumas 
that, regardless of one’s conceptual toolbox and political tendencies, cannot be ignored or passed over.’26  
That such arguments continue to have currency is evidenced, for instance, by the South African advocacy 
group, Corruption Watch, posting a feature piece in October 2015 with the title, ‘Corruption Affects 
Everything and Everybody.’27  Indeed, it has become almost a commonplace to refer to corruption in such 
all-encompassing terms, perhaps best reflected in the near apocalyptic pronouncement of the then World 
Bank President, Paul Wolfowitz, who in 2005 described corruption as the greatest evil facing the world 
since communism.28 
It is understandable that anti-corruption activists and campaigners should want to raise awareness 
of the serious problems generated by corruption, but there is a clear risk that in over-extending the use of 
the term, the effect is actually to so void the term of real meaning that it will ultimately de-sensitise people29.  
Some forty years ago, Aaron Wildavsky published an influential article with the title ‘If Planning is 
Everything, Maybe it’s Nothing’.30  Wildavsky’s focus was on the developing world, and it is striking how 
apposite his analysis remains, if we substitute ‘anti-corruption’ for ‘planning’: 
Where planning [anti-corruption] does not measure up to expectations, which is almost 
everywhere, planners [designers of anti-corruption measures] are handy targets.  They have been 
too ambitious or they have not been ambitious enough. They have perverted their calling by 
entering into politics or they have been insensitive to the political dimensions of their task.  They 
ignore national cultural mores at their peril or they capitulate to blind forces of irrationality. (…) 
If they are supposed to doctor sick societies, the patient never seems to get well.’31  
Such seemingly contradictory calls will strike a chord amongst many who have observed anti-corruption 
efforts over recent years.  Indeed, it could be argued that corruption, like planning in Wildavsky’s original 
conception, has become ‘a way of restating in other language problems we do not how to solve’32; in turn 
most anti-corruption efforts are bound to fail unless we can find more effective ways of unpacking the 
problem we are seeking to address. 
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A starting point for such unpacking would be to move away from an undifferentiated conception 
of corruption.  Even if we accept the generic definition of corruption as being the abuse of power for 
private gain, in practical terms that still leaves a vast array of different activities that fall within that remit.  
Indeed, so vast are the differences – ranging from a traffic officer extorting a bribe from an innocent 
motorist to a government minister selling decision-making to private interests – that it is unhelpful in 
operational terms to describe all such actions simply as corruption.  We need to be able to make a 
meaningful differentiation between these (and other) types of activity, even if they fall within the same 
spectrum.   Just as we routinely differentiate within other wide-ranging spectrums (for instance, between 
different frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum, or between different severities in the Autistic 
spectrum), so we should expect to identify different types of corruption.  As Bussell has argued, ‘If we are 
serious about understanding the dynamics of corruption both theoretically and empirically, then a more 
meaningful conversation about the ways in which we operationalize the concept is necessary for pushing 
forward our knowledge.’33  
To be sure, there have been various attempts to identify such differentiations.  One such recent 
approach is that of Bauhr,34 who draws a core distinction between ‘need’ and ‘greed’ corruption.  The 
former builds on coercion and extortion (for instance, forcing citizens to pay bribes to access services they 
should have a right to access), and the latter on collusion (for instance, government ministries selling 
favourable legislation to private interests).  Bauhr points out how this distinction challenges the idea that 
corruption will necessarily give rise to collective action responses borne of popular outrage.  Much ‘greed’ 
corruption is ‘unobtrusive’ and can remain invisible for long periods.  As others have done, Bauhr questions 
the idea that relying on principals willing to enforce anti-corruption legislation is a credible approach to 
tackling the issue; instead, anti-corruption efforts would do better to address how corruption is experienced 
and seen in different societies and adjust their focus accordingly. 
Other dichotomous classifications include ‘petty’ versus ‘grand’ corruption35 (sometimes referred 
to as ‘bureaucratic’ versus ‘political’ corruption36), or ‘systemic’ versus ‘individual’ corruption.  A more 
detailed schema was developed by Alatas37, whose typology drew a core distinction between ‘extortive’ and 
‘transactive’ corruption, but with several sub-types identified within each strand (including, for instance, 
defensive, investive, nepotistic, supportive, autogenic) in order to provide a more nuanced categorisation.  
Johnston38 has distinguished between different ‘syndromes’ of corruption, focusing on influence markets, 
elite cartels, oligarchs and clans, and official moguls; he outlines different political and economic 
opportunities, as well as the nature of institutions, in each of these syndromes. 
Whilst these categorisations offer important insights, it is noteworthy that a great many of the most 
widely-cited and influential analyses of corruption make no reference to any such attempt to distinguish 
between different types – nor even to identify what is understood by corruption itself.  In much of the 
existing literature, therefore, we are faced with a lack of fit between attempts to conceptualise and describe 
corruption on the one hand, and empirical accounts of the causes or impact of corruption on the other.  
Bussell notes that ‘analyses of corruption are problematic for the purposes of cumulating knowledge on at 
least two levels. First, it is difficult to tell if analysts are using the same initial concept of corruption to 
inform their theoretical perspective. (…) Second, even in those cases where analysts specify their concept 
of corruption, the operationalization of that concept is likely to differ dramatically across different empirical 
analyses.’39  Bussell herself suggests distinguishing between types of corruption according to how they relate 
to different types of state resources and in particular who has indirect influence and direct control over 
government policies, public licenses and contracts, government jobs and public goods and services40.  This 
is a promising approach, but does not address a further issue that is explored in more detail below: that is, 
what ‘counts’ as corruption changes over time and space.  As Neild points out, ‘the nature of the activities 
that are held to be corrupt has changed with time and has differed from one part of the world to another, 
in step with the rules governing society.’41 
 
Locus: thinking more deeply about where corruption takes place 
My argument here is that differentiation between different types of corruption is a necessary, but nor 
sufficient, step if we are to find more effective ways to combat it in its various manifestations.  In addition 
to that differentiation, we need to develop a more realistic understanding of the different levels and 
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locations in which different types of corruption take place.  It is striking that much of the academic literature 
on corruption focuses on nation-states as the primary unit of analysis.  In particular, there is no shortage 
of work that seeks to link corruption with a host of variables that are measured at the level of nation-states, 
including such things as levels of GDP, foreign direct investment, human rights, judicial effectiveness, press 
freedom, political institutions, the number of women in government, bureaucratic rewards, and so forth.42  
In these studies, sometimes corruption is the dependent variable, and sometimes the independent variable; 
rarely, though, is corruption defined in anything other than the most generic terms.  It is arguable that this 
lack of conceptual specification is a key contributory factor in the sometimes contradictory findings from 
such research: notably, according to some authors, corruption can (in certain circumstances) have a positive 
effect on economic development, whereas according to others it has only negative effects; some argue that 
corruption flourishes under ‘big’ government, whereas others point to the Nordic states as evidence to the 
contrary.  Even laboratory based experiments, which have become increasingly popular amongst 
economists who study corruption, have led to ‘some puzzling, contradictory results’.43 
One thing that nearly all these studies have in common is that their account of corruption, whether 
as dependent or independent variable, derives from some form of global index: most often, Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, or the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index, but also 
the Global Corruption Barometer, the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, 
Freedom House reports and others.  There has been a veritable explosion of such indices and rankings in 
recent years, described as a ‘frenzy’ by Cooley, with eighty-three new indices established since 1990.44  One 
stimulus for this frenzy, according to Cooley45, was the desire to measure what was believed to be the 
ineluctable march of progress in post-Communist states towards market-based liberal democracy.  The new 
indices were designed to track that process, at the same time as underlining the superiority of western 
institutional arrangements for delivering positive performance across a whole range of indicators. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index and the Control of Corruption Index are well-established and 
have assumed an important place in the ever greater focus on ‘the quiet exercise of power through 
indicators’,46 with global rankings increasingly driving policy-making both nationally and internationally.47  
However, there is now an extensive literature on the many problems – both conceptual and methodological 
– involved in attempts to measure corruption (and many other indicators of government quality), which 
relate primarily to a mismatch between concepts and their measurement, an over-reliance on proxy 
indicators, and western-focused elite bias.48  There is no need to rehearse those arguments in any detail 
here, but it is important to note, as Cooley observes, that, ‘[a]t the most basic level, rankings provide 
specialized information about the performance of states on a number of issues. Rankings and ratings (…) 
reduce complex phenomena into quantifiable indicators that can be used to assess the performance of 
states’.49  Leaving aside the question of how a single indicator can conceivably capture a concept as complex 
as corruption, the key point to underline here is the emphasis on states and, by extension, state activity.  It 
is individual countries that are the focus of the most widely-cited indices. 
This focus on individual countries in both measurement and ranking could be seen as somewhat 
ironic, given that ‘[t]he practice of global corruption rankings has been a central part of the construction of 
the corruption issue as a global, rather than comparative, country-specific, issue’.50 By the ‘global’ nature of 
the problem of corruption, however, is meant that it is an issue that afflicts nations across the world, 
amenable to being identified and measured within state borders.  Hence the rankings by country.  Moreover, 
it is a problem that reflects state activity, meaning the institutions and activities of governments rather than 
the private sector.  Hence the focus on institutional reforms to engender ‘good governance’, as discussed 
above. 
There are two main problems with this approach to analysing corruption.  First, it reflects an ever 
more unrealistic understanding of how corruption works in practice; second, it reflects an ever more 
unrealistic understanding of how contemporary states are organised and function.  Profound changes in 
the nature and organisation of the contemporary state mean that many of our traditional concepts and 
categories in regard to power and authority – perhaps most notably, the separation between public and 
private sectors and the autonomy of state action – need to be revised.  There is burgeoning literature on 
the post-Cold War new world order and what might be termed the ‘post-modern state’ in which national 
borders have become increasingly irrelevant owing in large measure to new technologies that have changed 
how states operate.51  Often described (not without controversy) as ‘globalisation’, one of the key changes 
	 7	
has been greater integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, foreign 
direct investment, capital flows, migration, the spread of technology, and military presence. To be sure, 
these changes have been uneven and their full impact is still to be worked out, but it is undoubtedly the 
case that traditional notions of national sovereignty (and all that goes with that idea) are being refocused 
and reformulated. 
Whatever the merits or otherwise of debates about globalisation, what is clear is that some forms 
of corruption have seen significant changes in recent years.  As Shelley argues, 
In recent decades, globalization has catalysed a sea change in the level of corruption. Money can 
easily be moved internationally, to major banking centers and offshore locales, via wire transfers. 
(…) In the new globalized economic order, worldwide corruption undermines states and permits 
the siphoning off of large amounts of national revenue with dizzying speed.52 
Of particular importance in this respect has been financial market liberalisation, which has wrought 
profound changes in the nature of and the players within the sector, with new fields emerging based on 
financial mathematical modelling and algorithms that are dependent on access to cheap computing power.53  
The growth of new forms of ever more complex securities and derivatives, designed in part to stay ahead 
of regulatory frameworks, was accompanied by a changing attitude towards risk and speculation, which was 
in large part responsible for the global financial crisis that emerged in 2007-08.  In turn, such developments 
have contributed to an erosion of trust in the financial sector, in particular, and also to the broader citizen 
disillusionment that has been reflected in the protests referred to above.  As Hosking has observed54, trust 
is a vital element within the web of interdependence that characterises contemporary societies, and the 
growing reliance on regulation as opposed to reputation as a primary mechanism for integrity management 
can undermine generalised social trust and contribute to conditions conducive to corrupt exchanges.55 
It could be argued that it suits the interests of countries in the developed world, most of which do 
well in the global rankings, to focus on corruption within individual states.  That way, they avoid having to 
confront the extent to which they are complicit in facilitating the growth in worldwide corruption.  
According to Bukovansky, 
…focusing international attention on corruption as a characteristic of developing country 
governments can obscure the broader permissive context of the international financial architecture, 
through which activities such as offshore tax havens and money laundering operate to sustain 
corrupt payment systems, not to mention the facilitation of “state capture” by financial interests.56 
What is not open to question, however, is that some forms of financial corruption in the developing world 
have been assisted by opportunities for money laundering that are linked to lax enforcement of regulations 
in key centres such as London, New York and Singapore.57 
In an important recent study, Findley, Nielson and Sharman58 focus on ‘shell companies’ that 
cannot be traced back to their real owners and therefore enable crimes like corruption, sanctions-busting, 
tax evasion and illegal trade in drugs and weapons.  They make the telling point that although regulatory 
efforts underpin most attempts to combat these issues, notably via the inter-governmental Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), a focus on the state misses the central role of service providers: 
It turns out that governments are not the main locus of compliance with international financial 
transparency standards. Rather, firms such as the GT Group, which provide incorporation services 
for clients seeking to set up new businesses, are the primary points where international standards 
mandating that shell companies can be traced back to their real owners are either followed or 
violated.59 
The activities of shell companies, and their role in enabling corruption, highlights how the capacity of states 
to regulate activity is being transformed in an increasingly transnational financial world, in which the 
architecture of compliance mechanisms is itself open to manipulation by private interests.60  Such 
developments, that create new opportunities for corrupt rulers in particular, underline the extent to which 
boundaries between public and private sectors are becoming increasingly blurred. 
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 Some analysts have spoken of what amounts to the privatisation of public power.  Wedel’s recent 
study of the so-called ‘shadow elite’61 has argued that in many areas the functional separation between 
public and private has effectively been superseded.  Wedel developed her analysis on the basis of post-Cold 
War developments in Poland, before extending it to look at Russia and the USA.  She identifies the rise of 
so-called ‘flexians’, who operate within new forms of social network and manoeuvre seamlessly between a 
range of different roles: government advisors, think tank employees, business consultants, media pundits, 
and so forth.  As a result, ‘private players are afforded fresh opportunities to make governing and policy 
decisions without meaningful government involvement.  Whether for profit or to advance an agenda, they 
can privatize policy beyond the reach of traditional monitoring systems.’62 This has been especially apparent, 
for instance, during US-led reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, where ‘private contractors not only carry 
out public functions but oversee, supervise and manage other contractors who perform such functions.’63  
Wedel contends that transnational political and financial elites have become ever more inter-linked, leading 
to the emergence of what has been termed elsewhere a financial-political complex64 and reinforcing the 
ineffectiveness of regulation in the banking and financial sector in particular.  As Johnston reflects, ‘[i]n 
some respects, international boundaries between the public and private sectors, and between political and 
economic power, are weakening or vanishing as rapidly as international borders’.65    
 This blurring of traditional spheres in the ‘post-modern’ state matters greatly for our understanding 
of corruption.  As Wedel herself notes, analytic concepts such as ‘corruption’ and ‘conflict of interest’ 
struggle to capture the operational complexity of how ‘flexians’ function.66  Yet, in much of the existing 
work, corruption is routinely understood as necessarily involving state officials: ‘the private wealth-seeking 
behaviour of someone who represents the state and the public authority, or as the misuse of public goods 
by public officials for private ends.’67  Such an emphasis cannot capture the reality of much contemporary 
corruption, especially in some parts of the world: ‘limiting corruption exclusively to the state sector is 
difficult in most developing and post-Communist countries, as there is an absence of clear boundaries 
between state office and private business.’68  Even if there is growing recognition amongst some analysts 
of the need to extend our understanding of corruption beyond just the public sector, in practice many of 
the indices and rankings that measure corruption and have been used to assess both its determinants and 
its impact focus specifically on state or public sector activity.  Thus, TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
‘measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption’69, and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption 
indicator ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain’.70  One 
consequence of this focus is that the anti-corruption discourse – at least until very recently – has made 
virtually no mention of such issues as tax havens, tax evasion, capital flight, or the offshore financial world.71 
It is therefore highly ironic that some of the leading measures of corruption have themselves 
contributed to the blurring of the distinction between public and private: 
The last two decades have seen the rapid rise of private actors playing governance functions such 
as setting standards, resolving disputes, and framing appropriate international responses to 
common challenges. (…) For example, though senior officials at Transparency International deny 
their role as a source of global regulation, TI has been the central actor in the spawning of a new 
transnational anti-corruption advocacy network.72 
The lack of attention paid to changes in the nature and organisation of contemporary states as a result of 
processes linked to globalisation, and the increasingly transnational nature of corruption, seriously 
undermines those approaches that see corruption as a country-specific issue linked to the public sector.  By 
extension, attempts to develop anti-corruption strategies that build upon such an understanding are almost 
bound to fall short, insofar as they tend to focus on institutional fixes that are either too generic or else 
wrongly targeted.  In particular, the notion of ‘good governance’ that has underpinned many anti-corruption 
initiatives fails to reflect the reality of how contemporary states function in practice, even those that look 
like Denmark; as Mungiu-Pippidi points out, ‘anti-corruption efforts cannot be effective unless they are 
contextual’73.  That means paying more attention to the complex dynamic between historical development 
paths and institutional architecture within individual states: ‘by copying the formal institutions of present-
day Sweden or Denmark, “one-best-way” transfer models presume that the actual path those countries 
took to get where they are does not matter’.74 
 There have been a number of recent studies that have sought to explore the long-term historical 
origins that underpin success and failure of states in terms of developing ‘clean’ or effective governance.  
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Many of these stress the importance of institutional design and political choices.  However, by definition, 
such studies generally concentrate on the internal architecture of given states, emphasising for instance the 
nature of the rules of the political game and the nature of institutions (extractive or inclusive)75, (in)equality 
in the distribution of income and assets76, the pursuit of power and military competition77 and so forth.  
Whilst they reinforce the need to pay attention to historical context and the role of agency, these types of 
study inevitably pay less attention to the impact of globalising trends on the nature and operation of 
contemporary states.  Indeed, Mungiu-Pippidi suggests that ‘while globalization has turned corruption into 
a global phenomenon in need of a global response, the battlefield upon which this war is won or lost 
remains national. (…) [T]his war cannot be fought and won internationally, although it might help if we 
conceptualize international anticorruption assistance as the empowerment of domestic forces…’.78  In 
regard to many manifestations of corruption, this is undoubtedly true.  However, when dealing with the 
kind of transnational flows of corrupt money outlined above, as well as the emergence of transnational 
networks of elites, then national-level responses are not only likely to miss their target, but are also 
potentially vulnerable to precisely the kind of collective action difficulties highlighted in response to the 
principal-agent approach.79  
 
Focus: adjusting the lens 
Hocus-pocus and locus-driven considerations indicate that if we are to address corruption for the purposes 
of effective policy, we need to disaggregate it into different types, as well as between the different levels 
and locations in which it occurs.  In particular, we need a better understanding of how different forms of 
corruption operate in practice in specific settings.  A useful starting point might be to distinguish between 
macro-, meso- and micro-level approaches, although it should also be acknowledged that these different 
levels do not operate as mutually exclusively spheres and developments in one can influence those in 
another.  At the macro-level, the focus should be on the developing international geo-political and financial 
architecture outlined in the previous section, to see how it has influenced and shaped the emergence of 
new transnational corruption networks.  Some important work has already started to be done in this area, 
such as that by Shelley and by Findley, Nielson and Sharman, referred to above.  Not only do we need 
more studies in such a vein, but we also need to see them inform anti-corruption initiatives more directly.  
National level responses remain as primary battlefields, but concerted international efforts to address the 
ease with which corrupt money can flow across borders are also essential.  Indeed, it is instructive in this 
regard to consider how the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the USA, a national-level response to 
concern over US companies engaging in bribery, came to act as a catalyst for subsequent efforts by both 
the OECD and United Nations to reconstruct corruption as a global problem.80  Without similar 
international policy responses to tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions and other forms of complicity in money 
laundering operations, national level initiatives to prevent corrupt financial transfers risk being hamstrung.  
In fact, it is arguable that the development of transnational corruption networks, with their links to both 
international crime and to terrorism, represent the most urgent challenge the anti-corruption movement 
faces. 
 At the meso-level, we need to focus on corruption at the level of the nation-state, but also to move 
beyond mechanistic approaches to using indices and rankings – particularly those that provide a single 
rating per country – as dependent and independent variables.  That is not because such approaches have 
no value; on the contrary, we have learned a lot in recent years about the causes and consequences of 
corruption, understood grosso modo, and those parts of the world where it is endemic as opposed to 
sporadic or isolated.  For all the disagreements about precise causal mechanisms, we can assert – with 
caveats – that corruption (especially bribery) is more deeply embedded in less developed parts of the world; 
that it tends to be linked with less effective and poorer performing political and administrative institutions; 
and that it is also associated with poorer outcomes on most measures of quality of life, though not 
necessarily overall levels of inequality.  But there is probably little more that we can usefully learn in this 
vein.  Instead, what we need to understand in more detail is how and why it takes particular forms in 
different countries, and how its specific manifestations have developed in given settings.  That is, within 
individual countries, we need to understand better the relationship between historical development paths, 
institutional configurations, socio-economic organisation and particular corruption issues. 
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 There is already some important work that has started to address such questions, and it is notable 
that much of it does not deal with corruption per se, so much as forms of governance81, as evidenced in 
the above-cited work by Acemoglu and Robinson, or in Rothstein’s recent work on the quality of 
government82. In this book, Rothstein focuses on particular trajectories that have affected the quality of 
government (understood in his terms as referring primarily to impartiality in the exercise of power) to 
demonstrate that we need to understand how and why (in)efficient institutions become established in spite 
of what large-n analyses might lead us to expect about the relationship between democracy and economic 
growth.  One of his chapters provides a striking case study of how Jamaica and Singapore have followed 
dramatically different trajectories in spite of strong similarities in their post-independence starting points in 
the early 1960s83.  In similar vein, Mungiu-Pippidi looks at different historical paths to corruption control 
approaches in a range of countries, focusing on the competing claims of structural, institutional and 
equilibrium models and exploring in depth several contemporary ‘achievers’: Chile, Uruguay, Estonia, 
Botswana, Taiwan and South Korea.84  What emerges from these various studies is that we need to explore 
combinations of issues, and interdependencies between them, not least because ‘control of government in 
a society has to be understood as a complex balancing act rather than as a group of separate factors 
determining corruption’85. 
 In practical terms, this means we also need to understand the interdependencies between the 
transnational developments highlighted in the previous section, and the reality of how nation-states are 
organised in practice.  Increasingly, we are likely to witness the emergence of multiple challenges to the 
formal models of governance within a given state, both from national and from transnational actors – in 
particular, challenges driven by demographic factors (‘youth bulge’, un- and under-employment), political 
crises (declining trust in the political class and institutions, exacerbated by issues such as migration flows 
into Europe), economic uncertainties (market volatility linked to geopolitical tensions) and their interaction 
with the rent-seeking opportunities that have expanded through globalisation86.  We therefore need more 
nuanced, detailed and sophisticated analyses of what local practices are understood as being corrupt, how 
they change over time, and what their organisation looks like in given states. 
Some twenty years ago, Cartier-Bresson explored the emergence of institutionalised socio-
economic networks of corruption.87  Such networks offer a system of hybrid co-ordination for the exchange 
of goods and services, which may be economic, political, social, symbolic, and so on.  Equally, networks 
establish standards – usually non-monetary and non-material – that manage such exchanges and engender 
values systems that are not reducible to market relationships.  Cartier-Bresson stressed the need to explore 
how different organisational forms foster particular types of corruption and encourage individuals to join 
corruption networks rather than abide by the law.  In a somewhat similar vein, though from a different 
disciplinary perspective, Ledeneva has explored informal networks in Russia.  In a series of important 
studies88 over recent years, she has explored methods of informal governance to describe how power 
networks substitute the role of formalised vertical structures in the provision of public goods like security, 
justice and health.  Describing ‘sistema’ as the reality of how things get done in post-socialist Russia, 
Ledeneva identifies different kinds of network that have built up around Vladimir Putin, including an inner 
circle, core contacts, useful friends, and mediated contacts.  The key point is that informal governance and 
networks undermine the core characteristics of a democratic state: in particular, the rule of law and properly 
functioning autonomous state institutions.  Moreover, globalisation has reinforced informality by opening 
up new opportunities and increasing the opportunity costs of trying to operate outside the ‘sistema’.  As 
Ledeneva indicates, the kinds of institutional reform derived from principal-agent understandings of 
corruption would be highly unlikely to achieve any purchase within the contemporary Russian state. 
 The meso-level approach draws more attention to specific sectors, in order to understand better 
the modalities of corruption and corruption-related risks in key areas.  Although there have been some 
attempts to explore the link between particular sectors and corruption (notably, for example, public 
administration, the energy sector, the judiciary, defence and security and so forth), these have often taken 
the form of seeking to account for the extent or overall level of corruption within a given polity.  What is 
needed now is a more detailed understanding of how and why corruption takes place within these sectors: 
what it looks like in practice, what particular characteristics it has, and how we can better identify risks.  It 
is remarkable that in the latest version of Matthew C. Stephenson’s compendious bibliography on 
corruption and anti-corruption, which runs to some 337 pages, just twenty entries specifically reference 
corruption and infrastructure, ten reference corruption and construction, and sixty-one reference 
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corruption and procurement, despite these being prime locations of corrupt exchanges89.  Items on other 
key sectors such as parliament, bureaucracy, health, education, and utilities number in the tens, and there 
are just five entries that deal specifically with private sector involvement in corruption.  Studies of the media 
and corruption focus overwhelmingly on its watchdog role in revealing scandals, but there is a dearth of 
work on corruption within the media, or its role in shaping understandings and framing debates about 
corruption90, or on the relationships between media owners and other key players in the post-modern state.  
 This brings us to the third, micro-level, approach that can deepen our understanding of how 
corruption operates in the contemporary world.  Here, the focus should be on how and why individuals 
engage in various different kinds of corruption, moving beyond the basic incentives-based model of 
instrumental rationality that has underpinned much economic analysis.91  We need a better understanding 
of how corruption is experienced and understood within specific contexts, what motivations and strategies 
lie behind an individual’s decision to engage in a corrupt act, and how corrupt networks develop and sustain 
themselves.  There have been some promising developments in the literature and again much of it is focused 
on the post-Communist states.  A relatively early example is the study by Miller, Grodeland and 
Koshechkina, which looked at how ordinary citizens cope with government in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic, exploring the quality of democracy in these four countries and how it impacted 
on individuals’ day-to-day dealings with officials92.  Their study – based on focus group discussions and in-
depth interviews with members of the public and junior officials, supported by large scale surveys – 
underlines the complexity of that relationship, and of the motivations that underlie individual actions. 
A more explicitly qualitative approach has been adopted by Torsello and his colleagues, using 
ethnographic approaches to analysing corruption within public administration in a range of countries, 
including Hungary, Bosnia, Russia and Kosovo.  This work emphasises the importance of looking at a 
variety of explanations to understand how corruption becomes embedded at societal level, exploring how 
the process of signification of corruption is shaped and influenced by cultural perceptions of integrity:  
‘because there are different local explanations to corruption and its related phenomena (clientelism, 
nepotism, trade of influence, abuse of office, illegal gift-exchanges and so on), corruption is 
extremely resistant to eradication and ultimately it is adaptable to institutional development and 
reform. (…) [H]ow the benefits of corruption are understood differs significantly according to the 
social and cultural norms and values that instruct citizens to perceive the real salience of corruption 
in their everyday life.’93 
 
The micro-level emphasis on the individual values and motivations that underpin decision by citizens either 
to engage in or to resist corruption is complemented in the work of Zinnbauer, who looks at ‘ambient 
accountability’.  That is, he seeks to understand how people shape, use and engage with the built 
environment and public places and explores design interventions that can help citizens identify and exercise 
their rights.94   
 In addition to these kinds of analyses, we also need more carefully targeted quantitative and 
experimental approaches.  In particular, social psychological research would be valuable to help understand 
the interactions that help influence individual decisions to engage in corrupt exchanges.  In a recent article 
that bemoans the lack of social psychological research on corruption, in marked contrast to the rich body 
of work on deviance and rule-breaking more generally, Zaloznaya95 calls for the application of interactionist 
social psychology to three micro-sociological questions: what are the collective roots (rituals, traditions, 
institutions) of beliefs that are favourable to corruption; what are the communicative processes through 
which individuals acquire their definitions of (in)appropriate behavioural patterns; and what are the 
particular contextual cues that evoke different beliefs about corruption.  Whilst recognising the practical 
challenges of such research, Zaloznaya is withering about the assumptions of strategic instrumentality that 
underpin so many current approaches to analysing corruption, arguing that 
‘It is precisely in the contexts that lack Western-style bureaucracies, have flexible boundaries 
between public and private domains, and rich legacies of gift and exchange economies, that 
dominant neoliberal approaches to corruption tend to yield inaccurate and culturally insensitive 
conclusions.’96 
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Whilst symbolic interactionism is hardly likely to resolve the kinds of issues outlined in this article, it may 
– in collaboration with a range of other insights and approaches drawn from a range of different disciplinary 
traditions – help us to develop a more nuanced, complex and realistic way of both understanding and 
combating different forms of corruption at an appropriate scale and level. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that three main reasons explain the mismatch between the academic attention 
devoted to corruption over the last quarter-century and its limited practical impact.  First, the dominance 
of economistic analyses of the role of incentives in decision-making has given rise to proposed institutional 
fixes that are too abstracted from reality to gain purchase.  That dominance was partly prompted by a 
misplaced assumption that market-based liberal democracies would become the modal regime type 
following the collapse of communism.  Second, an emphasis on the nation state as the primary unit of 
analysis has not kept pace with significant changes in how some forms of corruption operate in practice, 
nor with the changing nature of states themselves.  Third, different types of corruption are insufficiently 
disaggregated according not just to kind and form, but also to the locations in which they occur (sectoral, 
organisational, geographical), the actors involved, and the dependencies that enable them.  This reflects an 
overuse of the term ‘corruption’ in both academic literature and policy recommendations; insufficient 
attention is paid to what exactly is being addressed and ultimately, the notion of corruption, without 
adjectives, is a poor guide both to analysis and to policy prescription. 
Although it is widely recognised in the literature that corruption is not just one thing, such 
recognition has often not been translated into research design.  In particular, many recent large-n studies 
have in practice used an undifferentiated concept of corruption to serve as either a dependent or 
independent variable, seeking to explain a host of specific failings across a very wide canvas.  Moreover, 
where there have been attempts to disaggregate corruption, these have often proposed bipartite, rather than 
graded, classifications (grand/petty, political/bureaucratic, need/greed, and so forth).  In practice, 
corruption is a much more complex phenomenon than such dichotomous approaches can conceivably 
capture.  Indeed, it follows from the arguments outlined in this article that the notion of corruption 
incorporates at least four significant dimensions that should inform analysis, two of which relate to focus 
and two to locus (see Figure 1).   
[FIGURE 1 around here] 
First, we should be much clearer when discussing corruption what specific type we mean: there are 
important differences, for instance, between kleptocracy, bribery, influence-peddling, and so forth, not just 
in how they operate, but also in which actors and what kinds of resource exchange are involved.  Too often 
in the research on corruption, there is a rhetorical acknowledgement of these different types followed by 
unreflective conflation of them in practice through reliance on aggregate indicators.97  Second, we should 
specify in what particular sector the corruption in question takes place and, therefore, which constellations 
of actors are involved – as well as any relevant interactions and dependencies that serve as enablers.  Third, 
we need to be more aware of the level at which any specific type of corruption is operating, whether it be 
a complex transnational network allowing shell companies to launder huge sums of money, for instance, or 
a network of local law-enforcement agents taking advantage of their position to secure non-monetary 
favours.  Fourth, we should look more closely at the direction of corruption, in terms of the role of culture 
in relation to values, attitudes, norms, roles, rituals, framing mechanisms and how they help shape particular 
manifestations of what behaviours are understood as corrupt in different contexts. 
Interacting with these four dimensions are two further considerations that should have a significant 
impact on how we analyse different forms of corruption and develop strategies to combat them.  First, in 
any given jurisdiction, we need to assess the extent to which public services are managed and delivered on 
a more universalistic or a more particularistic basis, recognising variation in different sectors is possible.  
Second, we need to assess the extent to which regimes are organised and operate in line with formal or 
informal practices, and how that has been shaped by the various developments associated with 
globalisation.  In short, whenever we are confronted with any analysis that refers to ‘corruption’ – 
particularly when corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain – we should ask 
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what kind of corruption is it, where is it taking place, who is involved, what are their motivations, who/what 
is needed to allow it to take place, what level does it operate at, what sectors are implicated, what are the 
key interdependencies, how does it relate to the broader social context?  Without clear answers to these 
kinds of question, it will remain difficult to develop interventions that have an impact on the lived reality 
of specific instances of actual corrupt practices, as opposed to generic observations about which places are 
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